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NOTES
CONTAINING THE EFFECT OF HA WAI HOUSING
A UTHORITY V. MIDKIFF ON TAKINGS FOR
PRIVATE INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midki, I the Supreme Court up-
held the Hawaii Land Reform Act 2 against a challenge that the Act
violated the public use provision of the fifth amendment. 3 The Act
allows the state to use its eminent domain power to cause a transfer
of residential lot ownership from large landholders to the lessees
living on the lots. 4 Although this land reform scheme shifts property
between private parties, the Midkiff Court held that the state's pur-
pose of ameliorating the effects of a land oligopoly satisfied the fifth
amendment's public use clause.5
The Supreme Court last confronted the public use provision in
its 1954 landmark decision of Berman v. Parker.6 The Berman Court
set forth a highly deferential rational basis test and upheld an urban
redevelopment act under which public agencies and private entities
acquired condemned property. 7  The Midkhi court expanded
Berman's scope by applying the rational basis test to a land reform
scheme that placed all of the condemned property in private
ownership.8
This Note analyzes Midkiff's potential impact on future cases
involving the use of eminent domain to assist private industry be-
cause such cases are likely to continue generating the most contro-
versy in the state courts. 9 The Note concludes that, under the
federal constitution, the deferential rational basis standard will al-
low takings for private industry.10 The Note then considers
Midkiff's potential influence on the review of takings for private in-
1 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
2 HAwAII REV. STAT. § 516 (1976).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment's public use provision is made
binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896).
4 See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
6 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
7 See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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dustry under state constitutional public use provisions1" and con-
cludes that Midkiff will not persuade state courts to alter their
construction of state constitutions. Furthermore, the Note argues
that even if state courts are tempted to apply a rational basis test,
they should not follow Midkiff's deferential standard because it vio-
lates the policy against takings for private uses 12 and disregards the
historical distinction between public and private transferee
takings. 13
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Eminent domain constitutes the government's power "to take
property for public use without the owner's consent."' 14 A "taking"
occurs when the government forces a transfer of property from an
individual to the government or to another individual. 15 The fifth
amendment provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use without just compensation."' 16 Hence, the government's
eminent domain power is subject to two conditions: a taking must
serve a public use, 17 and the taking entity must provide just com-
pensation I8 to the former owner. In Midkiff, the Supreme Court
confronted the public use component of the fifth amendment.
A. Defining Public Use
Historically, courts developed two definitions of public use:
"use by the public" and "use for the public benefit." "Use by the
public," a narrow view, sanctions the taking of property only for a
use that opens the condemned property to the general public.19 For
example, in early America, acquisition of upstream flood lands to
generate power for grist mills satisfied the "use by the public"
formula because members of the local community were entitled to
I See infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 146-65 and accompanying text.
14 1J. SACKMAN & P. RoHAN, NICHOLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11, at 1-7
(rev. 3d ed. 1981).
15 Government regulations that unduly restrict the economic return from property
interests also constitute a taking. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922) (state regulation of coal mining constituted a taking). This Note does not ad-
dress this type of taking.
16 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
17 The fifth amendment does not expressly forbid taking property for nonpublic
uses, but the public use clause is generally understood to imply a prohibition of such
takings. 2AJ. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, NICHOLS' THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.14 (rev.
3d ed. 1983).
18 This Note does not consider the issue of the amount of compensation necessary
to satisfy the fifth amendment.
19 2AJ. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, supra note 17, § 7.02[1l.
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use the mills. 20 Some courts adopted a "use for the public benefit"
approach, which represents a broader view of the public use con-
cept. The "use for the public benefit" formulation allows takings
for the purpose of promoting the general welfare, even though the
condemned property is not opened to the general public.2 1 Thus,
the taking of flood lands to generate power solely for private manu-
facturing enterprises satisfied the "use for the public benefit" test
because the takings advanced the interests of the local
communities. 22
Following many years of development in the state courts, 23 the
Supreme Court's initial approach to the public use concept avoided
the selection of either the "use by the public" or the "use for the
public benefit" definition.2 4 In cases that defied the "use by the
public" definition, the Court allowed an exception based on neces-
sity. In Clark v. Nash25 the Court upheld a statute that allowed a
taking for an irrigation ditch that serviced only one individual's
property. The "use by the public" formula was not satisfied because
only one individual had access to the irrigation water. The Court
reasoned instead that the absolute necessity of irrigation to make
otherwise valueless land productive constituted a public use.2 6 The
20 See Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 206
(1978); Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENvrL. L. 1,
23-25 (1980) (both discussing mill acts).
21 2AJ. SACKMAN & P. Ro", supra note 17, § 7.02[2].
22 Meidinger, supra note 20, at 24.
The major treatise on eminent domain, 2AJ. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, supra note 17,
warns against following either the "use by the public" or the "use for the public benefit"
view in all cases. The authors argue that "use by the public" might be construed to
allow takings for hotels and theaters but to prohibit other improvements necessary to
promote prosperity. Furthermore, "use for the public benefit" might authorize takings
to assist commercial enterprises but prevent condemnation for a highway that is open to
the public yet does not present sufficient public benefit. Id § 7.02[3]. See also infra notes
110-28 and accompanying text (discussing potential use of eminent domain to assist
private enterprise).
23 Prior to the 1870s, the federal government brought condemnation actions under
state statutes in the state courts. The federal government began taking property
through the federal courts when a state court held that the state could not condemn
property on behalf of the United States. Berger, supra note 20, at 212-13.
24 In Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), the Court found
that a taking to allow irrigation of millions of arid acres would yield great wealth to the
entire state, thus serving a public "purpose." Id. at 161. The Court's reference to a
public "purpose," rather than a public "use," is consistent with a "use for the public
benefit" definition. The Court also noted that although the general public could not use
the irrigation water, all of the adjacent landowners had access to it, id. at 162, thus ar-
guably satisfying the "use by the public" definition.
25 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
26 Id. at 369-70. The Utah statute at issue provided that an individual could access
irrigation water by widening an irrigation ditch through neighboring land. In upholding
the statute the Court noted that it "must recognize the difference of climate and soil,
which render necessary these different laws in the States so situated." Id. at 370.
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Court thereby created a necessity-based exception to the "use by
the public" definition.27
Eventually, the Court confronted a case that satisfied neither
the "use by the public" definition nor the necessity-based exception.
In Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power
Co., 28 the Court applied a "use for the public benefit" test and up-
held a statute permitting the taking of downstream lands to accom-
modate the egress of water from a hydroelectric dam. The Court
did not categorize the taking as necessary to make the property pro-
ductive but stated that energy production formed "the very founda-
tion of all our achievements and all our welfare." 29 Thus, the Court
keyed into a "use for the public benefit" definition and then de-
clared that "[t]he inadequacy of use by the general public as a uni-
versal test is established."30 The Court's subsequent decisions
continue to reflect a preference for the "use for the public benefit"
definition of public use.3'
B. The Supreme Court's Standard of Review
Under the Supreme Court's "use for the public benefit" defini-
tion, a public use constitutes the sovereign's purpose for using emi-
nent domain and a taking represents the means of achieving that
end. The Court's standard of review requires, first, that the sover-
eign's purpose yield a sufficient public benefit, and second, that the
taking adequately further the government's ends.32
The Court has been more deferential in reviewing takings that
transfer property to the government (public transferee takings) than
those that transfer property to other private parties (private trans-
feree takings). Public transferee takings are less likely to purpose-
fully benefit private individuals and serve private use ends.33 The
27 In Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906), the Court
again applied the necessity-based exception. The Strickley Court upheld the taking of a
right-of-way for an aerial bucket line to transport coal from a mine. The Court asserted
that Clark "proved that there might be exceptional times and places in which the very
foundations of public welfare could not be laid without requiring concessions from indi-
viduals to each other." Id. at 531.
28 240 U.S. 30 (1916).
29 Id. at 32.
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 82 (1923) (upholding taking of
private property for transfer to private individuals dislocated by construction of reser-
voir); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) ("It is not essen-
tial that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, should directly enjoy
... any improvement in order to constitute a public use."); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135, 155 (1921) ("use by the public generally of each specific thing affected cannot be
made the test of public interest").
32 See infra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
33 In United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896), the Court illumi-
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Court's deferential attitude toward public transferee takings means
that the degree of benefit and the relationship between the taking
and that benefit are not closely scrutinized. The Court has been less
deferential, however, to private transferee takings because they are
more likely to further private use ends. Consequently, in private
transferee cases the Court has required a more substantial degree of
benefit and a stronger relationship between the taking and the pub-
lic benefit or purpose.3 4
Finally, the requirement that the sovereign may only take prop-
erty for a public use implies the corresponding restriction that the
sovereign may not take property for a private use. The transfer of
property from one private party to another, merely to benefit the
recipient, constitutes a private use. Of course, if the condemned
property is transferred from a private party to the government for
use, the use will not be private. Even in the event of a public trans-
feree, however, there must still exist a justifying public use.3 5 For
example, government confiscation of an unpopular individual's pri-
vate property solely to hurt that individual does not qualify as a pub-
lic use.
nated the reason for applying a deferential standard to public transferee takings. The
Court upheld the federal condemnation of lands to preserve and mark a historic battle-
field. The Court stated that the legislature's declaration of public use "will be respected
by the courts, unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation." Id. at 680.
The Court explained that it would take a "different view" if the legislature transferred
the power of condemnation to a private corporation, because "the presumption that the
intended use. . . is public is not so strong as where the government intends to use the
land itself." Id. See infra notes 140-145 and accompanying text (discussing policy rea-
sons for avoiding private uses).
34 Commentators generally have not distinguished the Court's treatment of public
and private transferee takings. Many commentators have referred to the Court's review
as uniformly deferential and have classified takings into federal and state categories. See,
e.g., Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
LJ. 599, 608-09 (1949); Note, Public Use, Private Use, andJudicial Review in Eminent Domain,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 409, 414 (1983).
The Court's takings cases, however, indicate a distinction between public and pri-
vate transferee takings. See, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S.
55 (1937) (private transferee, less deference); Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States,
269 U.S. 55 (1925) (public transferee, extreme deference); Brown v. United States, 263
U.S. 78 (1923) (private transferee, less deference); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Ange-
les, 262 U.S. 700 (1923) (public transferee, extreme deference); see infra notes 41-46, 48-
52 and accompanying text. The chronological order of these cases supports the propo-
sition that the Court considers the nature of the transferee as an independent variable in
determining the standard of review. The Court granted great deference in Rindge, a
public transferee case, in the same year that it yielded less deference in Brown, a private
transferee case. Two years after Brown and Rindge, the Court granted extreme deference
in the public transferee case of Old Dominion, but 12 years later the Court held the private
transferee taking in Thompson unconstitutional.
35 2AJ. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, supra note 17, § 7.10 (discussing transfers that are
not private but do not meet public use requirement).
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1. Private Transferee Takings
The Court has upheld private transferee takings that promote
substantial public purposes.3 6 In Block v. Hirsh37 Congress sought to
relieve a wartime housing shortage in the District of Columbia by
allowing lessees to hold over past the expiration of their leases,38
thus taking the lessor's right to use the property. The Court empha-
sized public health purposes and stated that "[h]ousing is a neces-
sary of life."3 9 The furtherance of a human necessity constitutes a
substantial benefit and typifies the kind of public purpose that satis-
fies the Court's requirements in private transferee cases. 40
The Court also has required a reasonable relationship between
a private transferee taking and the government's purpose for the
taking. In Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp.41 the Court held
that pro rata limitations on gas production were not reasonably re-
lated to the public purpose of preventing waste. The gas producers
in Thompson established that they conducted their operations with-
out waste, and therefore the taking of their gas through production
limits was not reasonable. 42 Absent a reasonable relationship be-
tween the taking and the public purpose, the taking constituted an
impermissible private use in favor of other producers. 43
36 Originally, the Court chose to yield to state court opinions rather than develop
its own public use test. Berger, supra note 17, at 213. The Court reasoned that state
courts were in a better position to judge local conditions that would give rise to a dis-
tinction between a public and private use. See, e.g., Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry., 208
U.S. 598, 606-07 (1908) (state courts more familiar with factors like "the capacity of the
soil, the relative importance of industries to the general welfare, and the long-estab-
lished methods and habits of the people"); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905)
(state courts more familiar with local conditions important to irrigation and mining).
The Court still required, however, that a substantial public purpose support the exercise
of eminent domain. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
37 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
38 The holdover tenants in Block were to pay the same rent they had been paying
during the term of the lease, unless modified by the designated government commis-
sion. Id. at 154.
39 Id. at 156.
40 Several other private transferee cases demonstrate the Court's requirement of a
substantial benefit. In Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), the
Court concluded that the comprehensive irrigation scheme at issue would tap tremen-
dous wealth and held that for any individual farmer to be included in the project, the
benefit to that individual's productive capacity had to be "substantial." Id. at 166-67. In
Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905), the Court allowed a taking for an irrigation ditch
that aided only one person. The Court based its decision on necessity and cautioned
that it was not approving "the broad proposition that private property may be taken in
all cases where the taking may promote the public interest and tend to develop the natu-
ral resources of the State." Id. at 369.
41 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
42 Id. at 69-70.
43 Id. at 78-80.
Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923), another private transferee case, demon-
strates the reasonable relationship requirement. The Brown Court upheld a taking of
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2. Public Transferee Takings
The benefit in public transferee cases can be less significant
than the substantial benefit required in the private transferee cases.
In Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles44 the state took ranch property
for a highway that terminated within the ranch boundaries. The
ranch owners complained that the highway did not connect with any
major road and was not necessary to public travel.45 The Court held
that the mere recreational benefits provided by these coastal moun-
tain roads constituted a sufficient public purpose.46 The Court's re-
view of legislative claims of a public use for public transferee takings
often approached total deference, with the Court stating that "it is
the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a public
use."47
In addition to its limited scrutiny of the government's ends, the
Court requires only a minimal relationship between the taking and
the public purpose in public transferee cases. In Old Dominion Land
Co. v. United States48 the federal government condemned property
that it had leased for military warehouses in World War I. The mili-
tary purpose clearly constituted a public purpose,49 but the con-
demnee alleged that the government took the property to prevent
land to resettle people dislocated by a reservoir. The Court stated that "the acquisition
of the town site was so closely connected with the acquisition of the district to be flooded
and so necessary to the carrying out of the project that the public use of the reservoir
covered the taking of the town site." Id. at 81.
44 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
45 Id. at 706.
46 Id. at 707-08. The Rindge Court stated that "[a] road need not be for a purpose
of business to create a public exigency; air, exercise and recreation are important to the
general health and welfare; pleasure travel may be accommodated as well as business
travel; and highways may be condemned to places of pleasing natural scenery." Id. at
708. The public benefit in Rindge falls short of the substantial public purpose required
in private transferee cases. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
47 United States ix rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551 (1946). In Welch the TVA
flooded lands for a reservoir which cut off the only highway access to a small North
Carolina town. The TVA agreed to acquire property on which a highway could be built,
relieving the state from responsibility for constructing a new access route to the isolated
community. Id. at 548-51. The Court viewed "the entire transaction as a single inte-
grated effort on the part of T.V.A. to carry on its congressionally authorized functions,"
id. at 553, and found that "when serious problems are created by its public projects, the
Government is not barred from making a common sense adjustment in the interest of all
the public." Id. at 554. The Welch Court even went so far as to distinguish previous
cases that held that public use was subject to judicial review, suggesting the possible
abolition of public use review. Id. at 552.
The majority opinion in Welch prompted a concurring justice to take exception to
the implication that public use issues are beyond judicial inquiry. Id. at 556-57 (ReedJ,
concurring). One commentator also concluded that "[t]he Supreme Court has repudi-
ated the doctrine of public use." Comment, supra note 34, at 614.
48 269 U.S. 55 (1925).
49 Id. at 57-58. The Old Dominion Court stated that "the military purposes men-
tioned ... clearly were for a public use." Id. at 66.
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the loss of the buildings it had erected, and not to serve future mili-
tary purposes. 50 The Court held that the government's assertion
that the taking served military purposes was "entitled to deference
until it is shown to involve an impossibility." 5 1 Because military
purposes "may have been entertained" by the government, the rela-
tionship between the taking and the purpose proved sufficient.52
C. Berman v. Parker
In 1954, the Supreme Court handed down the landmark public
use decision of Berman v. Parker.53 Berman upheld a congressional
act54 that provided for the acquisition and redevelopment of a
blighted area in the District of Columbia. A plan adopted under the
act called for the transfer of part of the property to public agencies
for streets and recreational areas and the sale or lease of the remain-
der to private individuals. 55
A department store owner sought to enjoin the taking of his
property, alleging that the condemnation of commercial nonslum
property to develop a more attractive area did not qualify as a suffi-
cient public use. He alleged further that the resale of the property
to a private individual resulted in an invalid private use.56 The
Court announced a very deferential standard for determining a le-
gitimate public purpose, stating that "when the legislature has spo-
ken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive."' 57 Discussing the relationship between the taking and
the public purpose, the Court stated that "[o]nce the object is within
the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is
also for Congress to determine." 58
Applying this deferential standard of review, the Berman Court
easily upheld the taking. The Court concluded that the promotion
of urban renewal and aesthetic goals fell within the scope of the po-
lice power 59 and constituted a valid public purpose. The Court re-
jected the contention that the resale of condemned property to
private individuals was an invalid private use and recognized private
enterprise as a legitimate vehicle for urban redevelopment. 60
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
54 District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, 60 Stat. 790 (1946)
(codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-801 to -820 (1981 & Supp. 1984)).
55 348 U.S. at 30.
56 Id. at 31.
57 Id. at 32.
58 Id. at 33.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 33-34.
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Although the Supreme Court applied a highly deferential stan-
dard to a private transferee taking in Berman, the Court's holding
can be explained by the public transferee takings inherent in the
urban redevelopment plan. The Court, in rejecting the property
owner's contention that urban renewal should operate on a struc-
ture-by-structure approach, stated that "[t]he entire area needed
redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed
for the region, including not only new homes but also schools,
churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers."61 Consequently,
the private transferee taking could be viewed as incidental to the
public transferee taking, thereby justifying the more deferential
standard of review.
II
THE CASE: HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY V. MIDKIFF
After deciding Berman, the Supreme Court did not hear another
public use case for thirty years, until the decision in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midki. 62 Midkiff arises as a modem land reform case
with ancient roots. Polynesian immigrants settled the Hawaiian Is-
lands over one thousand years ago and established a feudal system
which divided the islands into large estates. 63 The concentration of
land ownership survived Hawaiian statehood and led to a situation
in which large landholders leased residential property, rather than
conveying the lots outright.64 Hence, people owned their homes
but leased the land beneath them.65 The Hawaii legislature found
that the land oligopoly distorted the market for residential property,
caused a shortage of fee simple residential lots, and inflated residen-
tial land prices. 66
61 Id. at 34-35.
62 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
63 Brief for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs at 3-5, Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff,
104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984) (amicus curiae for appellee).
64 104 S. Ct. at 2325. In the mid-1960s the Hawaii legislature found that the state
and federal governments owned nearly 49% of the land and 72 private landowners held
47% of the land in Hawaii. On Oahu, the most urbanized island, 22 large landowners
held 72.5% of the land titles. Id.
65 See Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62, 65 (D. Hawaii 1979).
66 The Hawaii legislature's findings as to the problems associated with concen-
trated land ownership were quoted by the district court in Midkif:
The economy of the State and the public interest, health, welfare, secur-
ity, and happiness of the people of the State are adversely affected by
such shortage of fee simple residential land and artificial inflation of resi-
dential land values.. . . If the inflationary trend of land continues un-
checked, the resultant inflationary total cost of living could create such a
large population of persons deprived of decent and healthful standards
of life that the consequent disruptions in lawful social behavior could ir-
reparably rend the social fabric which now protectively covers the life and
safety of all Hawaii's people.
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The legislature enacted the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 196767
to provide for the transfer of residential lots from landowners to
their lessees. The Act permits residential lessees to request the Ha-
waii Housing Authority (H.H.A.) to designate for acquisition the
lots they are leasing.68 If the threshold statutory requirements are
met,69 the H.H.A. may adopt either of two methods to transfer title
from lessors to lessees. Under one method the H.H.A. may itself
acquire title through condemnation, or the threat of condemna-
tion, 70 and subsequently sell the lot to the lessee. 71 Under a second
method, available when Midkiff was commenced, the H.H.A. could
forego acquisition and mandate the negotiation of a sale between
the lessor and lessee.72 The lessee provides the constitutionally re-
quired just compensation under both methods by payment of the
purchase price. 73
In 1978 the H.H.A. directed the trustees of the Bishop Estate,74
a large Hawaii landowner, to negotiate the sale of residential lots
with several lessees. 75 The trustees brought an action in federal dis-
trict court alleging a violation of the fifth amendment's public use
clause and seeking a judgment declaring the Act unconstitutional
and enjoining its enforcement. 76 The district court, relying on
Berman, 7 7 evaluated whether the ends of the Act "further the health,
Id. at 69 (quoting HAvAII REV. STAT. § 516-83(a)(4), (7) (1976)).
67 1967 Hawaii Sess. Laws 488 (codified as amended at HAwAii REV. STAT. § 516
(1976 & Supp. 1984)).
68 HAWAU REV. STAT. § 516-22 (1976 & Supp. 1984).
69 The lessees requesting the H.H.A.'s assistance must be living on lots that are
part of tracts of at least five acres. Id. § 516-1(2), (11). In addition, the H.H.A. is au-
thorized to act only when 25 tenants, or tenants on more than one-half of the lots, have
applied to the H.H.A. to designate the lots for acquisition. The H.H.A. must also hold a
hearing and find that the transfer of title involved will further the goals of the act. Id.
§ 516-22.
70 Id. § 516-22.
71 Id. § 516-30.
72 Id. § 516-51. The district court held the provisions allowing the H.H.A. to direct
mandatory arbitration unconstitutional in Midkiff v. Tom, 471 F. Supp. 871 (D. Hawaii
1979). The H.H.A. did not appeal this ruling, and the statute has been amended to
provide only mandatory negotiation. See Midkfl, 104 S. Ct. at 2326 n.3; HAwAui REV.
STAT. § 516-51 (Supp. 1984).
73 HAwAii REV. STAT. § 516-1(14), -24 (1976 & Supp. 1984) (requiringjust compen-
sation equal to fair market value). The Act provides that the H.H.A. may lend the les-
sees a portion of the purchase price, id. § 516-34, but in practice lessees have provided
the funds. Midkiff 104 S. Ct. at 2326.
74 Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, the last lineal descendant of the first Hawaiian
monarch, left a will that placed her lands in a charitable trust for the Kamehameha
Schools. The trustees of the Bishop Estate administered this trust, which consisted of
approximately 8% of Hawaiian lands. Brief for the Appellees at 3-4, Hawaii Housing
Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
75 Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2326.
76 Id.; see also Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. at 64-65.
77 Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. at 65-66.
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safety, morals, or general welfare of the people of Hawaii, and if the
means chosen to accomplish that objective are rational and not in
bad faith."'78 The court held that the transfer of title provided a
rational means of achieving the legitimate public purpose of land
redistribution. 79
On appeal by the Bishop Estate,80 the court of appeals identi-
fied five types of valid public uses8 ' but found that Midkif did not
comport with any of them. The court distinguished Berman by ex-
plaining that the taking in that case involved a change in use, which
fit into one of the Ninth Circuit's public use pigeonholes. The trans-
fer of title in Midkiff, however, did not involve a change in use. 2 The
court also reasoned that the government's temporary possession of
the property in Berman before resale distinguished that case because
at this point only a public transferee taking had transpired. The
public purpose of redevelopment was theoretically accomplished
before transfer from the government to a private individual.8 3 The
court rejected the district court's test as inapplicable to takings cases
in general8 4 and noncongressional takings in particular.8 5 The
78 Id. at 67.
79 Id. at 69. The court held in the alternative that any of the Act's purported goals
would serve a public use. Id. at 69-70 (citing HAWAII REv. STAT. § 516-83 (1976)). See
supra note 66 (enumerating act's goals).
80 Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983).
81 The court's five categories of valid public uses are:
A. The taking will result in condemnation of property for an historically
accepted public use.
B. The taking will result in a change in the use of the land.
C. The taking will result in a change in possession of the land.
D. The taking will result in a transfer of ownership from a private party
to a governmental entity.
E. The taking will result in a de minimis condemnation necessary to fa-
cilitate the development of nearby land.
Id. at 793-94.
82 Id. at 796. A concurring judge articulated a different standard from the major-
ity's standard based on changes in use. The concurrence applied a primary purpose test
to evaluate whether the primary purpose of the taking was a public or private use. Id. at
805 (Poole, J., concurring). The concurring judge found the Act in Midkiffunconstitu-
tional because "it authorizes an agency of the state, upon the application of a tenant, to
divest his landlord of the latter's entire property and to convey it to the erstwhile tenant
in fee for the sole purpose of constituting that tenant as the owner." Id. at 806; see also
infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the "primary purpose" test).
One dissenting judge disagreed with the majority's conclusion that there was no
change in use. The dissent argued that residential ownership differs from investment
ownership because residential owners treat the land differently than do lessees. The
dissent also stated that the real issue was whether there was a "public advantage" to the
transfer of title. 702 F.2d at 818-19 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
83 702 F.2d at 797 ("The key in Berman is the intermediate step in which the prop-
erty was transferred from the private owner to the government for a public purpose, i.e.,
the redevelopment of the area."). See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing state court reaction to Berman).
84 Deferential review of government regulation is appropriate under the tenth
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court characterized the act as "a naked attempt. . to take the pri-
vate property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and
benefit."8 6 Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the district
court and held the act facially unconstitutional.8 7
The H.H.A. appealed to the Supreme Court.88 The Court
quoted Berman with approval8 9 and summarized the Berman ap-
proach by stating that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is... coter-
minous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." 90 After
acknowledging the prohibition against private uses, 9' the Court
held that the proper test was whether "exercise of the eminent do-
main power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose." 92
The Court applied this deferential rational basis test to uphold the
Act, finding that the condemnation of residential lots to transfer ti-
tle from lessors to lessees was rationally related to the public pur-
pose of increasing residential fee simple ownership. 93 In response
to the court of appeals' assertion that the government must use or
possess the condemned property, the Court stated that "it is only
the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny
under the Public Use Clause. ' 94
III
ANALYSIS
The Midkiff Court's application of a deferential rational basis
amendment police power, but the court concluded that a stricter analysis should be used
in takings cases. The court noted that the Constitution considers a taking so much more
severe than a regulation that it requires just compensation. 702 F.2d at 797.
85 The cases employing a deferential standard involved congressionally authorized
takings, and the court found this a sufficient distinction from the state taking in Midkiff.
Id. at 797-98.
86 Id. at 798.
87 Id. at 796-98.
88 Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
89 Id. at 2328-29 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-33 (1954)).
90 Id. at 2329.
91 Id. (citing Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937); Cin-
cinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930); Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Min-
ing Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896);
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896)).
92 Id. at 2329.
93 Id. at 2330. The Court identified alleviation of the evils of concentrated land
ownership as a legitimate state end dating back to early America. Id. at 2330 & n.5. The
specific evil the Court found with the Hawaiian land oligopoly was that it "forced
thousands of individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their
homes." Id. at 2330. The facilitation of homeowner fee simple ownership of residential
lots, therefore, was a valid public purpose. The Court also found a rational relationship
between the taking and the public use ends because the Act authorized the transfer of
title only when a significant number of lessees wanted to purchase the residential lots
they occupied. Id.
94 Id. at 2331.
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test could prove most significant in future determinations of the
constitutionality of takings to assist private industry. Many of the
most controversial takings cases arising in the future will likely in-
volve takings to benefit private industry.95 Under the federal Con-
stitution, Midkiff's rational basis test permits any taking for private
industry that is merely "rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose." 96 State courts, however, are free to subject takings to a
higher standard of review under public use provisions of state con-
stitutions.97 State courts are unlikely to adopt Midkiff's deferential
rational basis test because state courts do not prefer this test and
because the extraordinary land reform project at issue in Midkiff is
unlikely to resurface and encourage the adoption of Midkiff's ap-
proach. Furthermore, state courts should not adopt the highly def-
erential Midkiff formulation because it ignores the policy against
takings that are motivated to serve private ends and disregards the
historical distinction between public and private transferee takings.
A. The Impact of Midkiff's Rational Basis Test
The Midkiff Court echoed Berman in announcing that the public
use requirement and the police power are "coterminous" 9 8 and that
the rational basis test the Court applies with great deference to so-
cioeconomic legislation under the police power also applies in pub-
lic use cases. 99 The rational basis test requires that legislative means
bear a rational relation to legitimate state ends. 100 Since the 1930s,
the Court has applied this standard to socioeconomic legislation in a
95 See, e.g., Meidinger, supra note 20, at 35 ("Though no logical limits are evident in
the cases, it nonetheless remains to be seen how far courts will be willing to go in al-
lowing local development authorities to condemn property for commercial purposes.");
2AJ. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, supra note 17, § 7.02[3], 7-42 ("If. .. 'public use' is synony-
mous with 'public advantage', or rather what the legislature might reasonably conceive
to be the public advantage, eminent domain might constitutionally be employed in be-
half of all large industrial enterprises.").
96 Midkif, 104 S. Ct. at 2329.
97 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 291-93 (1982) (state
court may read state constitution more broadly than Supreme Court reads federal Con-
stitution). See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 501-02 & n.80 (1977) (Supreme Court "cannot review state court determina-
tions of state law even when the case also involves federal issues"); see also Ross, Transfer-
ring Land to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent Domain, 51 GEo. W.SH. L. REV. 355, 359
& n.14 (1983) (some state courts have prohibited private transferee takings on the
ground that such takings are not for public use).
98 Midkiff 104 S. Ct. at 2329.
99 Id. at 2330 ("When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no
less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socio-economic legislation-are not
to be carried out in the federal courts.").
100 J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrutroNAL LAW ch. 13, § IV (2d ed.
1983) (discussing substantive due process and rational basis test).
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highly deferential manner, interpreting legitimate ends broadly and
hypothesizing such ends to match the legislation under review. 101
The Court has permitted a minimal relationship between means and
ends and has presumed sufficient facts to support a rational basis. 10 2
The Court will not "second-guess" the legislature unless an act is
arbitrary or irrational. An act would be arbitrary or irrational only
if no arguable relationship connected the ends and means. This ra-
tional basis test yields wide latitude to the government in the use of
eminent domain. Consequently, a considerable expansion of state
taking power could result if state courts choose to follow the Midkiff
approach.
1. The Emerging Issue of Takings to Assist Private Industry
Midkiff's influence on the future use of eminent domain will be
determined in the context of the kinds of takings cases that arise.
The government is permitted to employ eminent domain only in
situations that can meet the just compensation and public use re-
quirements common to both state and federal constitutions. The
just compensation requirement is the most immediate restriction
confronting the government because absent the ability to compen-
sate the condemnee, the state is unable to reach the stage where it
can argue that its exercise of power satisfies the more malleable
public use provision.'0 3
The necessity of raising funds through taxation or other politi-
cally unpopular mechanisms to provide the requisite just compensa-
tion may prevent the state from using large scale condemnation to
achieve its ends. 10 4 This barrier, however, disappears when the
transferee provides the funds to compensate the condemnee.
Under the act at issue in Midkiff, the lessees themselves were re-
101 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Go., 348 U.S. 483, 490 (1955) (hypothesizing
various ends for state regulation of sellers of eyeglass frames and lenses); Lincoln Fed.
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949) (upholding
state's right-to-work law as within state's authority to regulate "injurious practices");
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (rational basis test per-
mits state regulation of "filled" milk); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (upholding state minimum wage law for women). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTrrTIONAL LAW § 8-7 (1978) (discussing virtually complete judicial abdication
of review under rational basis test).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("exist-
ence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed").
103 The state is always free to argue that the taking constitutes a public use. Thejust
compensation requirement, on the other hand, is concrete and unyielding.
104 The just compensation requirement, in addition to compensating property own-
ers for their losses, ensures that the taking is actually for the public benefit. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 101, § 9-2, at 458 ("The public's willingness to pay ... would serve as proof
that the public had in fact been the beneficiary of what otherwise appeared to be a for-
bidden transfer .... ").
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quired to pay the fair market value of the leased property, thus pro-
viding the just compensation for the taking. 10 5 A self-financing
condemnation scheme, funded by the benefiting private transferee,
eliminates the necessity of imposing revenue-raising burdens on the
community. 10 6 A self-financing condemnation plan removes the
burden from the government and places it upon the private trans-
feree. The placement of the burden is important because the pri-
vate transferee may find it easier to overcome than the government.
A private corporation that desires to obtain certain property
may be able to meet the just compensation requirement more easily
than the government. Corporations have greater access to funds for
the acquisition of income-producing properties because they pool
the wealth of many investors through instruments of debt and eq-
uity which offer the investor a pecuniary incentive.107 The relative
ease with which commercial enterprises can meet the burden of pro-
viding just compensation is likely to encourage the government to
use eminent domain to aid private industry. State court cases involv-
ing takings of land for a shopping center, an industrial cite, a retail
outlet, and an automobile assembly plant have borne out this
possibility.108
2. Takings for Private Industry Under the Federal Constitution
Under Midkiff's rational basis test, government use of the con-
demnation power to transfer property to private industry for devel-
opment would satisfy the public use clause of the federal
105 Midif, 104 S. Ct. at 2325-26 n.2; see supra note 73.
106 The act challenged in Midkiff enables the state to compensate landowners
through funds provided by the lessees who receive title in exchange. This self-financing
scheme relieves the state from providing compensation. See supra notes 67-73 and ac-
companying text. However, for the land reform project to work, the lessees must be
able to afford to purchase their lots. The limitation of affordability may render the land
reform project at issue in Midkiffa less than perfect example of an "innovative us[e] of
the powers of eminent domain to redress social inequities." Mallin, American Land Re-
form, N.Y.LJ., June 25, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
107 See W. HUSBAND & J. DOCKERAY, MODERN CORPORATION FINANCE 27 (7th ed.
1972) ("flexibility of financial arrangement available to corporations makes it possible to
cater to both individual and institutional outlets in both a qualitative and quantitative
manner").
108 See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Raines, 24.1 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967)
(invalidating taking for industrial park); City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3
(Ky. 1979) (invalidating taking for industrial site); Prince George's County v. Collington
Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278 (1975) (permitting taking for industrial
development); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304
N.W.2d 455 (1981) (permitting taking for automobile assembly plant); Courtesy Sand-
wich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963) (permitting taking for World Trade Center); Karesh v. City Council of
Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978) (invalidating taking for convention
center).
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Constitution. The Midkiff Court applied its deferential test to a
wholly private land transfer from lessors to lessees. 0 9 The stan-
dard of review when the transferee is a private commercial enter-
prise remains the same; the taking need only be "rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose.""10 The government's purpose in
transferring property to private industry would be to increase em-
ployment and stimulate economic development. These ends are suf-
ficiently legitimate to satisfy the public purpose requirement of the
rational basis test because they promote the general welfare. The
government would argue that facilitating the transfer of property for
development by private enterprise is rationally related to increasing
employment and economic prosperity. This argument satisfies the
relational element of the.rational basis test because Midkiff requires
only that the connection between the ends and the means not be
impossible."' Midkiff's rational basis test, therefore, permits gov-
ernment assistance to private industry through exercise of the con-
demnation power under the federal Constitution.
3. Takings for Private Industry Uider State Constitutions
Although takings to aid private industry easily meet the public
use provision of the federal Constitution, states may still reject such
takings under their constitutional standards. Several state courts
have applied their state public use provisions to invalidate takings
that benefit commercial endeavors." 2 The post-Midkiffissue in the
state courts is whether Midkiff will prompt state courts previously
rejecting takings for private industry to alter their views and adopt a
rational basis test to permit these takings.
Midkiff may influence state courts to adopt a rational basis test
in two ways. First, Midkiff, a unanimous Supreme Court opinion,
could lead state courts by example to apply a more deferential stan-
dard. Second, if state courts agree that land reform serves a valid
public use, they may adopt the rational basis test because it is the
only test consistent with allowing land reform. This Note concludes
that neither possibility is likely to prevail because state courts do not
109 The Hawaii Land Reform Act does contemplate instances when the transfer will
not be "wholly private." See HAwAI REV. STAT. § 516-33 (Supp. 1984) ("In the event of a
wilful breach of contract of a lessee to purchase the leased fee interest, the authority may
sell or assign its interest .... "). Moreover, exercise of the power of eminent domain
actively involves the government in the transfer of property. See id. § 516-23, -30 (1976).
These provisions, however, do not defeat the proposition that the Act has "no . . .in-
termediate step in which the government holds the property for the accomplishment of
a public purpose." Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 1983); see infra note 125.
1O Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2329.
111 Id (citing Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)).
112 See supra note 108.
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favor the Supreme Court's rational basis test and the land reform
fact pattern remains a rarity.
a. The Midkiff Example. As a Supreme Court decision, Midkiffis
persuasive authority for application of the rational basis test. Sev-
eral state courts, however, have a history of rejecting the Supreme
Court's approach to public use cases."13 Thirty years before Midif,
Berman advocated an extremely deferential test, yet Berman did not
inspire state courts to adopt the rational basis test.' 14 State courts
simply disfavor the rational basis test.
b. Accommodating Land Reform. State courts refusing to allow
takings for private industry employ either a "use by the public"
standard 1 5 or a "primary purpose" test to review public use
cases. 116 The "use by the public" standard requires that the con-
demnation support a use that is open to the public. 1 7 A taking for a
commercial endeavor would fail the "use by the public" test because
a private corporation is not typically accessible for use by the public.
The "primary purpose" test compares the benefit to private trans-
ferees with the benefit to the public to determine which benefit is
greater. 118 One notable industry taking case found that the public
benefit prevailed, 119 but several courts have held that the private
transferee received the primary benefit of the taking and invalidated
it as an illegitimate private use. 120 Midkiff's rational basis test does
not require "use by the public" and is more deferential in assessing
113 See infra notes 115-16 (citing cases employing tests other than the rational basis
test).
114 See, e.g., Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d451,455 (Fla. 1975) (a
stricter "primary purpose" test is required because "private ownership and possession
of property was one of the great rights preserved in our constitution"); Karesh v. City
Council of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 342, 247 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1978) ("The restrictive
view of the power of eminent domain . . . is indicative of a high regard for private
property.").
115 See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 1083,411 S.W.2d 486,493
(1967); City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Ky. 1979); Karesh v. City
Council of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 342, 247 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1978).
116 See, e.g., Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1975);
Rudee Inlet Auth. v. Bastian, 206 Va. 906, 910, 147 S.E.2d 131, 135-36 (1966); Hogue v.
Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 834, 341 P.2d 171, 191 (1959).
117 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
118 If the taking serves a predominantly public purpose, then the private purpose is
considered merely incidental. See, e.g., Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d
451, 455-56 (Fla. 1975) (elaborating on primary purpose test).
119 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d
455 (1981) (per curiam). In Poletown the City of Detroit condemned an area of the city to
provide a site for an automobile assembly plant. Detroit was suffering from high unem-
ployment, and the court found that alleviating this problem was a public benefit that
outweighed the private transfer to the automobile company. Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at
459.
120 See cases cited supra note 116.
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the public benefit than the "primary purpose" test because it does
not attempt to weigh the private benefit.
Berman did not prompt universal acceptance of the rational ba-
sis test, but many states did develop formulations to allow takings
for the clearance of blighted areas.' 21 State courts applying the "use
by the public" standard or the "primary purpose" test to reject tak-
ings for private industry created special exceptions for urban rede-
velopment and distinguished urban redevelopment takings from
private industry takings. Some.courts indicated approval of takings
for blight removal under a necessity-based exception, reasoning that
urban redevelopment was necessary to make unproductive land pro-
ductive. 122 Other courts asserted that blight removal involved a
public transferee taking in which the government accomplished the
public purpose of slum clearance before incidentally transferring
the property to private individuals.' 23
If state courts confronted Midkiff as the law on land reform, as
they faced Berman on blight removal, then Midkiff might encourage
reappraisal of their public use tests. The taking in Midkiff is irrecon-
cilable with either the "use by the public" or the "primary benefit"
test. The transfer of title from lessors to lessees does not satisfy the
"use by the public" standard because the residential lots remain in-
accessible to the public. The land reform scheme also has difficulty
passing the "primary benefit" standard because the lessees who re-
ceive the property obtain the primary benefit from the transfer. 124
Land reform also does not lend itself to either of the two excep-
121 2A J. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, supra note 17, § 7.43, at 7-251 (urban redevelop-
ment is almost universally accepted as a public use); see infra notes 122-23.
122 See, e.g., City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Ky. 1979) (invalidat-
ing state statute providing for taking to assist private industry, but noting that slum
clearance satisfies public use requirement); Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799,
833, 341 P.2d 171, 190 (1959) (invalidating taking, but stating that "[t]his is not a recla-
mation project, or a slum clearance project, or a blighted area redevelopment").
The Supreme Court established a similar necessity-based exception in two of its
earliest private transferee cases. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
123 See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 1085,411 S.W.2d 486,494
(1967) (noting past holdings that public use not defeated by right to sell property after
public purpose accomplished); Rudee Inlet Auth. v. Bastian, 206 Va. 906, 911-12, 147
S.E.2d 131, 135-36 (1966) (housing authority takings are legitimate although the gov-
ernment can dispose of the property to private individuals when it is no longer needed).
There is little support for this distinction because redevelopment involves more
than the removal of blight. Redevelopment implies reconstruction, a task that private
transferees complete. See Comment, Eminent Domain: Private Corporations and the Public
Use Limitation, I1 BALT. L. REV. 310, 325 (1982) ("vacant lots serve no public purpose
. . . and cannot alone be considered as legitimate objectives of state police power").
Nonetheless, the court of appeals attempted to make the same distinction in Midkiff. See
supra note 83 and accompanying text.
124 The concurrence in Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 805-06 (1981) (Poole, J., con-
curring), applied a "primary purpose" test and found that the private benefit to the
residential lessees was greater than the public benefit. See supra note 82.
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tions established for blight removal. First, land reform does not fit
within the necessity exception. The title transfers in Midkiff were
not necessary to make unproductive land productive; they merely
shifted the ownership of already productive residential lands. Sec-
ond, land reform cannot be justified as a public transferee taking
because there was no intermediate government possession in Midkiff
sufficient to make the private transfer incidental. The transfer of
title to private lessees was not an incidental purpose, but rather the
primary purpose of the government's actions. 125
State courts that have rejected takings for private industry could
not allow Midkil's land reform under their current tests or under
the exceptions that were created for urban redevelopment cases.
State court acceptance of the land reform scheme, therefore, would
prod them to adopt a more accommodating rational basis test.
State court consideration of Midkiff's land reform scheme, how-
ever, appears improbable because state courts are unlikely to con-
front land reform cases. The feudal foundations that give rise to
land reform cases are unique to the state of Hawaii,1 26 and only one
other jurisdiction has encountered the land reform fact pattern. 127
State courts were situated to adopt Berman's blight removal position
because urban blight is widespread.' 28 If state courts do not con-
front land reform cases, they will not feel compelled to adopt
Midkiff's more lenient rational basis test. Thus takings for private
industry will continue to founder on state constitutional
requirements.
B. State Courts Should Reject Midkifl
Even if state courts consider adopting the rational basis test as
the test under state constitutions, they should not rely on the Midkiff
approach because it reflects unsound policy. The MidkiffCourt held
that any claim of a conceivable public purpose prevents invalidation
of a taking for a private use. Consequently, Midkiffignores the pol-
icy reasons for prohibiting takings motivated to serve private uses.
125 The Act authorized the government to take possession of the property before
transferring it to the lessees. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. The sole
purpose of the brief governmental possession is to facilitate transfer of tide. Thus, the
public purpose of the government's possession is even less significant than in the slum
clearance cases, in which the government actually cleared the slums before transferring
the property to private developers. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
126 SeeJ. STRAYER, FEUDALISM 11 (1965) (feudalism died out by seventeenth century,
before settlement of America); see also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing feudal origin of Hawaiian land oligopolies).
127 See Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Assocs., 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.) (division of
large landholdings for redistribution upheld), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946).
128 2A J. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, supra note 17 at § 7.43 (cases confronting urban
blight situations).
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In addition, Midkiff disregards the historical distinction between
public and private transferee takings.
1. Midkiff Ignores the Policy Reasons for Prohibiting Takings
Motivated to Serve Private Uses
The requirement that the sovereign may take property only for
a public use dictates that the government may not take property for
a private use. Thus, the state cannot transfer property from A to B
merely to benefit B. 129 The taking in Midkiffinvolved several charac-
teristics that indicated the legislature may have intended to serve
primarily private ends. The transfer of title in Midkiff did not in-
volve a physical change in the property's use or intermediate gov-
ernmental possession. In addition, the private transferee initiated
the taking and provided the just compensation. Consequently, the
court of appeals in Midkifffound the taking unconstitutional because
it supported an invalid private use. 30
The Supreme Court dismissed the possibility that the taking in
Midkiffwas motivated to benefit private individuals without discuss-
ing the private use elements of the Hawaii land reform program.' 8 '
The Court classified private use ends as illegitimate under its ra-
tional basis test,'3 2 explaining that "[a] purely private taking could
129 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
130 Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (1983).
131 The trustees of the Bishop Estate argued before the Supreme Court that indicia
of a private use in this case mandated the appellate court finding of the act's unconstitu-
tionality. The trustees listed the following private use indicia as present in the case:
(a) the takings may only be initiated by the very people who will receive
the property; (b) the takings are paid for by the private recipients of the
transfer, (c) the only property taken consists of the ground lots upon
which the new owners already own houses; (d) the takings transfer prop-
erty from one private party to another; (e) the takings effect no change in
the use or usability of the property or its environs; (f) there is no continu-
ing government oversight, regulation, or control once the transfer to
other private parties is completed; and (g) there is no obligation on the
part of the parties receiving the property to conform to any predeter-
mined plan for its use.
Brief for the Appellees at 23-24, Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321
(1984).
In a section of the opinion separate from its application of the rational basis test, the
Midkiff Court addressed the court of appeals interpretation of Berman that required inter-
mediate government possession for a taking to avoid the fate of a forbidden private use.
First, the Court pointed out that "use by the public" is not the Court's public use defini-
tion. Government possession that would satisfy a "use by the public" definition, there-
fore, is not mandated. Second, the Court noted that a private transferee taking may
sufficiently promote the public benefit to constitute a public use. Finally, the Court con-
cluded that "it is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scru-
tiny under the Public Use Clause." 104 S. Ct. at 2331.
132 Id. The Berman Court did not address the position of private uses within the
rational basis test but stated that private enterprise was an appropriate means of achiev-
ing redevelopment of a slum. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34.
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not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would
serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be
void." 13 3 The Court, however, did not articulate a distinction be-
tween illegitimate takings for private use ends and acceptable tak-
ings for public use ends. Instead, the Court defined invalid private
use ends as those which lack a legitimate public purpose.134 This
approach is consistent with previous cases in which the Court has
distinguished private use ends from public use ends by examining
the validity of the asserted public use.' 35
The difference between Midkiff and prior cases lies in the de-
gree of public use benefits the Court required. In previous private
transferee cases the Court looked for substantial public use ends, 136
but the Midkiff approach accepts any assertion of a "conceivable
public purpose."'' 3 7 The Court interpreted Missouri Pacific Railway v.
Nebraska138 to mean that a prohibited private use exists when the
state does not claim a public use.1 39 Application of the deferential
rational basis test increases the likelihood that the Court will find a
sufficient public use end. The previous requirement of a substantial
public use end resulted in a greater chance that the Court might not
find a valid public use and that the taking would fail as a private use.
Thus, Midkiff's rational basis test allows takings for primarily private
uses if the state advances some conceivable public purpose and low-
'33 104 S. Ct. at 2331.
134 The Midkiff Court, after asserting that private use ends were illegitimate, ex-
plained that "no purely private taking is involved in this case." Id. There was no private
use end because Hawaii did not pass its land reform legislation "to benefit a particular
class of identifiable individuals but to attack certain perceived evils of concentrated
property ownership in Hawaii-a legitimate public purpose." Id.
135 See, e.g., Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923) (taking for
highway extension is for public use); Hariston v. Danville & W. Ry., 208 U.S. 598 (1908)
(taking for railroad is for public use); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112
(1896) (upholding statute allowing taking for irrigation district); see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
137 Midkif, 104 S. Ct. at 2329.
138 164 U.S. 403 (1896). In Missouri Pacific the state forced the railroad to transfer
land to neighboring farmers to erect grain elevators. The state ordered the transfer to
prevent the railroad from giving "any preference or advantage" to other farmers who
had already built grain elevators with the railroad's permission. Id. at 413-14.
139 The MidkiflCourt quoted Missouri Pacfic, stating that the" 'order in question was
not, and was not claimed to be, . . . a taking of private property for a public use under the
right of eminent domain.'" 104 S. Ct. at 2329 (emphasis in original) (quoting Missouri
Pac. Ry v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 416 (1896)). However, Missouri Pacific did not articu-
late a standard of review. The Court merely emphasized that the case could not satisfy
the public use provision because there was not even a claim of a public use end. At the
minimum, therefore, the government must assert a public use goal. Furthermore, in
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), decided the same year as
Missouri Pacfic, the Court indicated that a substantial public purpose was necessary. See
supra note 40.
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ers the degree of public benefit necessary to establish a public
purpose.
The rational basis test neglects the possibility that a taking may
be motivated to serve private use ends. Thus the test has the poten-
tial of allowing private industry to enlist the government's eminent
domain power for its own purposes. The government might simply
submit to the demands of a private corporation interested only in its
own economic benefit. The private corporation wants only to ac-
quire desired property that might otherwise be unavailable or might
only be available at a much higher price than fair market value. Rel-
atively unsophisticated local governments may be unable to resist
powerful commercial interests, 40 and the small number of con-
demnees wield little political influence.14 ' A modest increase in em-
ployment and economic activity, therefore, might not be the chief
motive of either the corporation or the government, but it would
satisfy the rational basis test as a conceivable public purpose.142
The marriage of government and private industry to facilitate
takings motivated to benefit private individuals may produce unsa-
vory results that go unchecked by the rational basis test. The use of
eminent domain to assist private industry supplants the free mar-
ket143 and unjustly enriches the private transferee at the expense of
a condemnee who either does not wish to sell at fair market value or
does not wish to sell at all. 144 The rational basis test allows the pri-
vate transferee an unjust benefit and inflicts an unfair loss on the
condemnee because the requirement of only a conceivable public
purpose necessarily means that the benefit to a private transferee
may far outweigh the public benefit.' 45
140 See Millspaugh, Eminent Domain: Is It Getting Out of Hand?, 11 REAL EST. LJ. 99,
112 (1982) (noting that traditional public use doctrine may not provide appropriate
legal response to new generation of government takings for private industry).
141 See Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 409, 435-38 (1983) (arguing that condemnees have no power in majoritarian polit-
ical mechanism).
142 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
143 See Epstein, The Public Purpose Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain: A Constitu-
tional Liberty Under Attack, 4 PACE L. REv. 231, 257-64 (1984) (discussing takings for pri-
vate industry as infringement on "economic liberalism").
144 Furthermore, private transferee takings may prove detrimental to more than eco-
nomic interests. One commentator has argued that the use of eminent domain may
infringe liberty interests in some cases. See Note, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff:
A Final Requiem for the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain?, 60 NOTRE DAME LAW. 388,
394-99 (1985) (arguing that taking may infringe liberty interests "when a person's home
or lifetime business is condemned").
145 The potential for an improperly motivated transfer of property for a private use
is not the only reason to disfavor private transferee takings. The private transferee may
not be held continually accountable to serve public use ends. Moreover, private trans-
feree takings may act as a disincentive to investments in property by the involuntary
condemnee and other observers. Finally, allowance of private transferee takings might
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2. Midkiff Disregards the Historical Distinction Between Public and
Private Transferee Takings
The Midkiff Court extended Berman's deferential test and ended
the separate standard for public and private transferee takings by
applying the rational basis test to a private transferee taking. The
Court merged the stricter standard for private transferee takings
into the more deferential standard for public transferee takings
through a misplaced reliance on Berman and its public transferee
precedents and a misuse of the private tiansferee cases.
The Midkiff Court labeled Berman the "starting point" for its
analysis and relied heavily on the case as precedent for the rational
basis test.146 Berman, however, involved a comprehensive slum re-
development plan entailing both public and private transferee tak-
ings.147 The Court should have distinguished Berman as a
predominantly public transferee taking 148 to remain consistent with
the stricter standard that was previously applied to private trans-
feree takings. Furthermore, the Court in Berman relied primarily on
public transferee cases, 149 which utilized a different standard than
private transferee cases. Given that Berman included both public
and private takings and relied on public transferee cases for sup-
port, the Court in Midkif unjustifiably relied on Berman to fuse the
historically distinct tests for public and private transferee takings.
After discussing Berman, the MidkiffCourt elaborated on several
public transferee cases to establish support for its rational basis
test.150 The Court first discussed two public transferee cases cited
in Berman. The Court used Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States' 51
to declare that "deference to the legislature's 'public use' determi-
nation is required 'until it is shown to involve an impossibility.' "152
encourage widespread use of eminent domain and thereby imperil the institution of pri-
vate property. See Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent Domain,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355, 369-80 (1983) (discussing four policy reasons behind
stricter standard states may apply to private transferee takings).
146 104 S. Ct. at 2328-29.
147 The public transferee takings in Berman included transfers to the government for
homes, parks, streets, and recreational areas. 348 U.S. at 34. The private transferee
takings in Berman resulted from the possibility of eventual resale of a portion of the
property to private individuals. Id. at 31.
148 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing private transferee takings as
incidental to public transferee takings).
149 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (citing Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S.
55 (1925), and United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946), to justify Court's
"extremely narrow" judicial role).
150 104 S. Ct. at 2329.
151 269 U.S. 55 (1925).
152 104 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting Old Dominion, 269 U.S. at 66); see supra notes 51-52
and accompanying text (explaining "impossibility" component of the rational basis
test).
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The Court also cited United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 153 which advo-
cated almost absolute deference to congressional determinations of
a public use.154 The Court then relied on United States v. Gettysburg
Electric Railway, 155 another public transferee case, to state that "the
Court has made clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a
legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use 'unless the
use be palpably without reasonable foundation.' "156 All of these
cases apply a deferential test, and in light of the different treatment
previously accorded to public and private transferee takings, they
provide inadequate support for a private transferee test.
The Court cited two private transferee cases in support of its
standard. First, the Court cited Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilitites
Corp., 157 which affirmed the invalidation of a taking as unreasonably
related to the state's ends. The Thompson Court's refusal of a taking
did not exhibit an extremely deferential standard,158 but the Midkiff
Court attempted to distinguish the case parenthetically as "invali-
dating an uncompensated taking."' 159 Just compensation, however,
stands as a separate requirement from the public use grounds on
which the Thompson Court invalidated the taking. The Thompson
Court held that a pro rata limitation on the complaining sweet gas
producer was not rationally related to the public purpose of
preventing waste. 160 Even if the state had provided just compensa-
tion, the taking would still have failed because just compensation
does not affect the relationship of a taking to a public purpose.
Block v. Hirsh,16 1 the second private transferee case cited in
Midij, offers only illusory support. In Block, the Court uttered a
similar "reasonable relation" test.162 Block, however, should be dis-
tinguished on its facts. Block involved a congressional act that per-
mitted lessees in the District of Columbia to retain possession
beyond the expiration of their leases. 163 The Court focused on the
sufficiency of the government's asserted ends of alleviating a war-
time housing shortage that burdened government officers and em-
153 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
154 See supra note 47.
155 160 U.S. 668 (1896). See supra note 33.
The Berman Court cited Gettysburg Electric, but only to demonstrate that "the power
of eminent domain is merely the means to the end." 348 U.S. at 33. Berman did not rely
on Gettysburg Electric to determine the appropriate test. 348 U.S. at 32.
156 Midkif, 104 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting Gettysburg Electric, 160 U.S. at 680).
157 300 U.S. 55 (1937). See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
158 See L. TRIBE, supra note 101, § 9.2 at 458 n.10 (indicating that Thompson conflicts
with standard of review applied in other public use cases).
159 Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2330 (emphasis in original).
160 Thompson, 300 U.S. at 69-70.
161 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
162 Id. at 158.
163 Id. at 153-54.
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ployees and threatened public health. t64 This emergency, coupled
with the temporary nature of the taking, prompted the Court to de-
clare that the taking supported a sufficient public use.' 65 Providing
necessary housing in a wartime emergency is a more compelling in-
terest than assisting residential lessees who already have housing in
acquiring title to the ground lots beneath their homes. The impor-
tance of the ends in Block were considerably greater than those re-
quired under the Midkiff Court's rational basis test.
CONCLUSION
The potential for abuse of the eminent domain power becomes
especially significant when the government and private industry join
together for a common purpose. The government, by virtue of its
eminent domain power, can force the transfer of private property,
and private industry can pay the just compensation. The combina-
tion of these two entities can strip away much of the fifth amend-
ment's protection of private property. Courts safeguard the rights
of the condemnee to the extent that they require a public benefit to
justify the taking. Midkiff's rational basis test, however, demands
only a minimal public benefit.
The state courts are not bound by Midkiff, and those that have
rejected takings for private industry will not be persuaded to alter
their positions by the decision. State courts disfavor the rational ba-
sis test in the eminent domain arena, and the Midkiff land reform
scheme remains unlikely to present itself in jurisdictions east of the
Hawaiian Islands. Even if those courts desire to adopt a rational
basis test, they should not follow the Midkiff approach because it
ignores the policy reasons for prohibiting takings motivated to serve
private uses and disregards the historical distinction between public
and private transferee takings. Consequently, state courts should
continue to provide more security to the institution of private prop-
erty than the scant protection afforded by Midkiff.
Russell A. Brine
164 Id. at 154.
165 Id. at 156. The Court stated that "[a] limit in time to tide over a passing trouble,
well may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change." Id. at 157.
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